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Thu, 05 Nov 2026 15:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | HeyForm is an open-source form builder. Prior to 3.0.1, /api/upload accepts a file according to the client-controlled multipart file.mimetype while retaining an HTML filename, and static/upload serves the resulting file as text/html with contentSecurityPolicy: false. An ordinary user can therefore upload active HTML that executes on the HeyForm origin when a victim opens its returned URL. The same-origin script can access /graphql with the victim's session and read or modify data available to that account. The code also permits upload requests tied to an active public form through formId, openToken, and a fieldId belonging to a file or signature question, although the advisory did not fully verify that unauthenticated path end to end. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1. | |
| Title | HeyForm: Uploaded HTML files are served as text/html on the app origin with no CSP — stored XSS | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-79 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
No data.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-05T15:32:30.406Z
Reserved: 2026-09-29T14:18:02.921Z
Link: CVE-2026-102615
No data.
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-11-05T16:17:23.937
Modified: 2026-11-05T16:17:24.093
Link: CVE-2026-102615
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-11-05T16:30:12Z