| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix OOB read and cross-share confusion in ksmbd_validate_name_reconnect()
ksmbd_validate_name_reconnect() indexes
ab_pathname[share->path_sz + 1] without checking that the path is
longer than share->path_sz + 1 (d_path() fills the buffer from the
end). A durable fp is not bound to its original share, so a client
can preserve a file from a short-path share and reconnect it on a
long-path share, making strcmp() read past the PATH_MAX buffer -
with a long enough share path this oopses the kernel, and on a
mapped page it also gives a byte-equality oracle on adjacent heap
(the reconnect succeeds exactly when the out-of-bounds string
equals the requested name). A same-share variant with the durable
fp at the share root reads 1 byte past the buffer
(strlen(ab_pathname) == share->path_sz).
Check before comparing: the path must be longer than share->path_sz,
it must start with share->path, and the next character must be '/'.
The share root itself is accepted only for an empty name. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix parent dentry lifetime in directory enumeration
ksmbd_populate_dot_dotdot_entries() builds the ".." entry from
the open directory's d_parent and passes that pointer to
ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs() without taking a reference. That pointer
is only valid while the directory stays under this parent. If a
concurrent rename moves the directory elsewhere, the old parent loses
its last reference; a following rmdir then turns it into a negative
dentry with d_inode cleared, and after the RCU grace period the dentry
itself is freed. The worker still holds the raw pointer and
dereferences d_inode through vfs_getattr() and vfs_getxattr().
A remote SMB client, authenticated or guest, triggers this by listing
a directory while that directory is moved under a new parent and the
old parent is deleted. It can be done by the client itself with write
access or by other concurrent writers, triggering null-ptr-deref and
slab-use-after-free on a KASAN build.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
RIP: 0010:xattr_permission+0x9d/0x160
Call Trace:
vfs_getxattr+0x9c/0x1b0
ksmbd_vfs_getxattr+0x82/0x100
ksmbd_vfs_get_dos_attrib_xattr+0x7f/0x130
ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs+0x435/0x650
ksmbd_populate_dot_dotdot_entries+0x25e/0x630
smb2_query_dir+0xcf9/0x1a20
handle_ksmbd_work+0x5f1/0x1c80
process_one_work+0x90b/0x19d0
Fix by using the dentry reference counting APIs: take the parent with
dget_parent(), take a matching dget() on ".", and dput() the dentry
once ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs() has returned or the pattern does
not match. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: prevent session binding in compound requests
A failed multichannel binding can retain its target session on the work
item so that the error response can be signed. Subsequent compound
commands can then use that session together with a tree connection left
over from an earlier command.
Limit binding SESSION_SETUP requests to standalone messages during
message validation, before smb2_sess_setup() can replace work->sess.
Check both NextCommand and the current request offset to cover binding
in the first, middle and last positions of a compound. The existing
validation error path returns STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER and stops
processing the remaining commands.
This intentionally limits support for compounded binding. It is not a
protocol requirement that binding be standalone. Standalone binding and
non-binding compounds retain their existing behavior, without changing
session, tree or response encryption handling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: fix netns use-after-free in write_gssp()
While fuzzing with a customized syzkaller, I hit a refcount warning in
xprt_alloc(), reached from a write to /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xf8/0x120
CPU: 0 PID: 10404 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1-00096-gcfebfd3db73d
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xprt_alloc+0x83f/0x9d0
xs_setup_xprt+0xaf/0x3c0
xs_setup_local+0x47/0x7f0
xprt_create_transport+0x16c/0x730
rpc_create+0x38e/0x7f0
gssp_rpc_create+0xe2/0x180
set_gssp_clnt+0xba/0x1b0
write_gssp+0x200/0x310
proc_reg_write+0x240/0x330
vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1050
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x117/0x750
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() stores the struct net pointer as the
proc entry's private data without taking a reference on it, and an open
file descriptor does not pin the namespace either, as procfs only pins
the proc_dir_entry. write_gssp() reads that pointer back with
pde_data() and hands it to set_gssp_clnt(), which reaches xprt_init():
xprt->xprt_net = get_net_track(net, &xprt->ns_tracker, GFP_KERNEL);
get_net_track() -> get_net() -> refcount_inc() is unconditional, so
rpc_create() assumes its caller holds a reference on args.net.
write_gssp() does not.
Dropping the last ns.count reference does not make the file go away.
__put_net() only queues cleanup_net() on a workqueue, and the
remove_proc_entry() that fences off further writes runs from the
rpcsec_gss pernet .exit method, that is, from inside cleanup_net(). A
write landing between those two points increments a refcount that is
already zero. cleanup_net() does not re-read ns.count, so the namespace
is freed anyway and the rpc_xprt -- along with the AF_LOCAL socket
opened for it -- is left pointing at freed memory. The resurrected
count is visible to the rest of that teardown too: with
CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE the same cleanup_net() worker then trips
!mr_can_free_table() in ip6mr_free_table(), which tests check_net() on
the namespace it is freeing.
It reduces to opening /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy inside a new network
namespace, calling setns() back to the original one to drop the last
reference, and then writing "1" to the still-open descriptor.
Take the reference in write_gssp() itself and refuse the write when the
namespace is already gone. This is what procfs does for every other
/proc/net file: get_proc_net() is maybe_get_net(PDE_NET(PDE(inode)))
and seq_open_net() returns -ENXIO when it fails. PDE_NET() cannot be
reused here because the parent directory /proc/net/rpc carries no
namespace pointer. Adding a .pre_exit to rpcsec_gss_net_ops so the
entry is removed earlier would only narrow the window, since pre_exit
also runs from cleanup_net().
Live namespaces are unaffected: a write still returns the error from
set_gssp_clnt(), a write of "2" still returns -EINVAL, and reads are
untouched. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-fc: fix use-after-free in nvmet_fc_ls_create_connection()
nvmet_fc_ls_create_connection() looks up the association with
nvmet_fc_find_target_assoc(), which returns it with a reference held,
and drops that reference as soon as the target queue has been allocated.
iod->assoc is then dereferenced again by nvmet_fc_makeconnid() while
building the connection id.
The queue only borrows the pointer and takes no reference of its own.
Once the lookup reference is dropped the association is kept alive
solely by the reference taken when it was created, so a disconnect LS or
a remote port unregister running concurrently can free it before
nvmet_fc_makeconnid() reads it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:193 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1841 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888179f1b000 by task kworker/u9:2/1167
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:193 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1841 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021)
process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3322 kernel/workqueue.c:3405)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (archkernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
</TASK>
Freed by task 1167 on cpu 0 at 405.998150s:
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:57 mm/kasan/common.c:78)
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584)
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285)
kfree (include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2705 mm/slub.c:6405 mm/slub.c:6720)
nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1808 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021)
process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3322 kernel/workqueue.c:3405)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (archkernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888179f1b000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 2048-byte region [ffff888179f1b000, ffff888179f1b800)
Hold the lookup reference until the response has been built, and drop it
on the error path as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lockd: Fix use-after-free in nlmsvc_retry_blocked
nlmsvc_retry_blocked() examines the block at the head of nlm_blocked
under nlm_blocked_lock, then releases the lock before calling
nlmsvc_grant_blocked() or retry_deferred_block(). The nlm_blocked list
reference is all that keeps the block alive across that window.
nlmsvc_grant_blocked() does take one of its own, but not until after
the lock has been dropped. Unmounting the nfsd filesystem while a lock
request is still blocked reaches nlmsvc_traverse_blocks(), which drops
the list reference and frees the block along with the nlm_rqst hanging
off it.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nlm_async_call+0xd6/0x230
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811b04c808 by task lockd/8377
nlm_async_call+0xd6/0x230
nlmsvc_retry_blocked+0x61c/0x800
lockd+0x144/0x1c0
Freed by task 8392:
nlmsvc_release_block+0x231/0x290
nlmsvc_traverse_blocks+0x139/0x1b0
nlm_traverse_files+0x1aa/0xa00
nlmsvc_free_host_resources+0x12/0x60
nlm_shutdown_hosts_net+0x127/0x280
lockd_down+0xd5/0x1c0
Take a reference before releasing nlm_blocked_lock and drop it once
the retry has run. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: hackrf: fix use-after-free in hackrf_alloc_urbs() error path
hackrf_alloc_urbs() frees the URBs it allocated so far when one
allocation fails, but leaves the entries in dev->urb_list[] and
dev->urbs_initialized untouched. The caller, hackrf_start_streaming(),
then calls hackrf_free_urbs() on the error path, which walks
dev->urbs_initialized entries and calls usb_free_urb() a second time on
the already-freed URBs, causing a use-after-free (slab-use-after-free
Write in usb_free_urb()).
Drop the redundant cleanup loop inside hackrf_alloc_urbs() and let
hackrf_free_urbs(), which the caller already invokes on error, own the
cleanup of the successfully allocated URBs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix use-after-free in hugetlb_mfill_atomic_pte()
Let's fix another instance where we use a folio after dropping the PTL,
where someone else could e.g., MADV_DONTNEED it once we drop the PTL,
making us trigger a use-after-free on the folio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix use-after-free of a new anon folio
For a fault in a private mapping with nothing in the page cache,
hugetlb_no_page() allocates a folio, locks it and maps it. The folio has
one reference, which belongs to the page table entry from then on. After
dropping the page table lock the function still sets the migratable flag
of the folio and unlocks it.
Whoever zaps the entry in between frees the folio. The fault holds the
fault mutex and the lock of the vma. MADV_DONTNEED and the first unmap of
a hole punch, hugetlb_vmdelete_list(), do not take the fault mutex, and a
private vma only has a lock if it owns a reservation map: not with
MAP_NORESERVE, and not in the child after fork().
Then the flag is set in, and folio_unlock() is called on, a folio that is
free or has a new owner. A surplus page goes back to the page allocator
while it is locked:
BUG: Bad page state in process init pfn:108e00
flags: 0x200000000000059(locked|uptodate|dirty|head|node=0|zone=2)
page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
A page of the pool can be given to the next user, of any file, who locks
it and loses the lock to the late folio_unlock():
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1532!
hugetlb_no_page+0x111b/0x23e0
hugetlb_fault+0x3a9/0x14a0
An unprivileged process is enough: threads that write to a MAP_PRIVATE |
MAP_NORESERVE hugetlb mapping, threads that call MADV_DONTNEED on it, and
one that takes the freed pages for another file.
Until commit 3a47c54f09c4 ("hugetlbfs: revert use i_mmap_rwsem for more
pmd sharing synchronization") the fault held i_mmap_rwsem for reading,
which everybody who zaps takes for writing. The lock that commit
bf4916922c60 ("hugetlbfs: extend hugetlb_vma_lock to private VMAs") gave
to private vmas closed the window again, but only for those with a
reservation map.
Be done with the folio before the page table lock is dropped, as
hugetlb_wp() is with its copy. The function already unlocks page cache
folios under that lock.
Original fix generated by an LLM and sent in private by Josef.
[david@kernel.org: simplify+move comment] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails
aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a
failed start frees it again:
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox);
...
ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...);
if (ret)
goto free_channel;
...
free_channel:
xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann);
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That
pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a
usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,
aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message
helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.
It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls
aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,
after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context
survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return
value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is
left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every
later user of it takes the non-NULL branch:
- the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed
channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),
- a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() ->
aie2_destroy_context(),
- closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() ->
aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() ->
aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(),
and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()
followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already
freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.
The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -
aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing
it. Do the same here.
The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,
xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling
->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer
never outlives the structure holding it.
Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer
sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and
request_irq() can fail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: emux: Fix UAF of soundfont zones at note-on
snd_emux_note_on() looks up the matching zones via
snd_soundfont_search_zone(), which takes sflist->lock only during the
lookup and returns the raw zone pointers after releasing it. The
caller then stores them in vp->zone without any protection.
Meanwhile, a concurrent SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_REMOVE_LAST_SAMPLES ioctl may
unlink and free those zones in snd_soundfont_remove_unlocked(); this
leads to a use-after-free in snd_emux_note_on(), and later at
accessing the cached vp->zone, e.g. in snd_emux_send_effect().
Fix it by holding sflist->lock in snd_emux_note_on() over the whole
zone lookup and voice setup, and let snd_soundfont_search_zone()
require the caller to hold the lock, instead.
snd_soundfont_lock_preset() takes sflist->lock for setting
presets_locked, so the removal path now syncs with the note-on finish. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
filelock: keep superblock active through delegation wait
A caller may drop its path after try_break_deleg() returns a delegated
inode but before break_deleg_wait() finishes. The extra inode reference
held in struct delegated_inode does not keep the superblock active.
After a lazy unmount, closing the delegation holder can release the last
mount reference and shut down the superblock while another task waits for
the delegation break. The waiter's final iput() can then enter the
filesystem's eviction code after its superblock-private state was freed.
This has been observed as a KASAN use-after-free in shmem_evict_inode().
When try_break_deleg() saves a delegated inode, take an active reference
to its superblock while the caller still pins the mount. Keep that
reference through break_deleg_wait() and the final iput(), then release
it with deactivate_super(). This protects every caller of the helpers,
including the mknod, mkdir, symlink and rmdir paths that drop their path
before waiting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: guest_memfd: Gracefully handle xarray errors when binding a memslot
If inserting a memslot into a guest_memfd's bindings xarray fails,
propagate the error back to the caller, i.e. fail memslot creation as well.
Signalling success and continuing on with memslot creation results in
use-after-free, as the guest_memfd instance will remain reachable via the
memslot after the file is freed (kvm_gmem_release() won't nullify the file
pointer due to lack of a valid binding).
Opportunistically WARN and reject binding if KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY is
already set, partly to guard against goofs elsewhere, but mostly so that
KVM doesn't need to worry about clobbering flags when unwinding on failure.
Regarding the unwind, the slot must be fully prepared before inserting it
into the bindings, at which point the slot becomes reachable. I.e. waiting
to update the slot in order to avoid the ugly unwind isn't an option. And
as part of the unwind, explicitly nullify the relevant bindings, as xarray
can store a subset of entries when populating a range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: pfncache: use a dedicated invalidation sequence for cache refresh
The gfn_to_pfn_cache refresh path guards against mmu notifier
invalidations which complete while it has dropped gpc->lock for the
HVA->PFN lookup: hva_to_pfn_retry() samples kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq
and retries if it changed, or if mn_active_invalidate_count is still
elevated.
That is insufficient for HVA-based caches. mmu_invalidate_seq is only
advanced by kvm_mmu_invalidate_end() when the invalidated range
overlaps a memslot, and an HVA-based cache (e.g. the Xen shared_info
page mapped with KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO_HVA) need not be backed
by any memslot at all. An invalidation of the cached HVA which starts
and ends entirely within the lookup window is thus invisible to the
retry check: mn_active_invalidate_count is back to zero and the
sequence never moved. The refresh then publishes a mapping of a page
which has already been freed, and the next reader dereferences it:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_xen_shared_info_init+0x3c6/0x440
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880599c2900 by task syz.2.383/7257
Since gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start() deliberately skips caches
which are not currently valid (including one whose refresh is in
progress, as the refresh clears the valid flag before dropping the
lock), the retry check is the only line of defence, and it must fire
for *any* invalidation, not just those hitting a memslot.
Add a dedicated kvm->gpc_invalidate_seq, incremented by every
kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end() under mn_invalidate_lock
before mn_active_invalidate_count is decremented, and check it in
hva_to_pfn_retry() instead of mmu_invalidate_seq. Incrementing in
range_end() in the same critical section as the in-progress count
also closes the variant where the cache is activated with the
contested HVA only after invalidate_range_start() has run.
The same bug is also reachable through the per-vCPU vcpu_info cache
(KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO_HVA), where the stale mapping is
then dereferenced by kvm_setup_guest_pvclock() on the next KVM_RUN:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_setup_guest_pvclock+0x5bf/0x660
This intentionally makes refresh retry on *unrelated* mmu notifier
events; restoring precision (and reworking the GPC locking more
generally) is left for a subsequent series.
Reproducers: https://david.woodhou.se/xen_shinfo_race.c
https://david.woodhou.se/vcpu_info_race.c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add SRCU protection for virtual-mode HPT hcalls
The virtual-mode HPT hcall handlers (H_ENTER, H_REMOVE, H_BULK_REMOVE,
H_CLEAR_REF, H_CLEAR_MOD) call into book3s_hv_rm_mmu.c, which accesses
memslots via kvm_memslots_raw(). kvm_memslots_raw() uses
rcu_dereference_raw_check() to bypass SRCU lockdep annotation checking.
This is safe in real mode because the entire guest entry/exit is wrapped
in srcu_read_lock/unlock inside kvmppc_run_core() and
kvmhv_run_single_vcpu().
However, since commit 6165d5dd99db ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: add virtual
mode handlers for HPT hcalls and page faults"), these same handlers are
also executed in virtual mode via kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(), which runs
after SRCU has already been released on guest exit.
A concurrent KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION deletion or move can therefore
call synchronize_srcu_expedited() — which does not wait for this thread —
and then kfree(slot) and vfree(slot->arch.rmap) while the hcall handler
still holds a raw pointer to the memslot. lock_rmap() then writes to
freed vmalloc memory, leading to use-after-free and memory corruption.
Because kvm_memslots_raw() suppresses lockdep checks, this race is
entirely silent.
Fix this by factoring out the 7 HPT hcall handlers (H_REMOVE, H_ENTER,
H_READ, H_CLEAR_MOD, H_CLEAR_REF, H_PROTECT, H_BULK_REMOVE) into a
helper function, kvmppc_pseries_do_hpt_hcall(), and wrapping its call
site in srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu) / srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx).
Targeting only the HPT hcalls avoids wrapping non-HPT hcalls that sleep
(such as H_CONFER, H_REGISTER_VPA, H_PAGE_INIT) or handlers that already
acquire SRCU internally (such as H_RTAS). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: imx-jpeg: cancel timeout worker when streaming stops
Each per-fd context ctx owns a delayed_work (ctx->task_timer, callback
mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout) armed via schedule_delayed_work() at the end
of mxc_jpeg_device_run() to recover a stalled encode/decode job. The only
existing cancellation is cancel_delayed_work() in the frame-done IRQ
handler, which de-queues a pending work item but does not wait for a
callback that has already started, and it only runs when a frame completes.
When the fd is closed while a job is in flight (the frame-done IRQ has not
fired yet), nothing syncs the worker before mxc_jpeg_release() frees ctx
with kfree() after v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(). A queued or executing
mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout() can then recover ctx through
container_of(&ctx->task_timer) and dereference it (ctx->mxc_jpeg,
slot_data, dev_warn) after ctx has been freed.
Cancel the worker from mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming(). The cancel cannot live
in mxc_jpeg_release(): mxc_jpeg_device_run() arms the timer while holding
only hw_lock, not the mxc_jpeg->lock mutex that release holds, so a cancel
in release could still race a concurrent mxc_jpeg_device_run() that
re-arms the timer afterwards. mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() instead runs inside
v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() -> vb2_queue_release(), i.e. after
v4l2_m2m_cancel_job() has set TRANS_ABORT and waited for any in-flight job
to finish (so __v4l2_m2m_try_queue() will not queue and v4l2_m2m_try_run()
will not run any further job for this context, which prevents
mxc_jpeg_device_run() from re-arming the timer) and before the m2m context
is freed. cancel_delayed_work_sync() removes a pending work item and waits
for a running callback, so the worker can no longer race with the
subsequent kfree(). The cancel is placed before the buffer-release loop so
a concurrently running timeout callback cannot race with it over the same
buffers. If the frame-done IRQ canceled a still-pending timer, this cancel
is a no-op; if the timeout callback has already started, it waits for the
callback to finish. The same mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() call is also
reached from VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, which drains the worker early, although
STREAMOFF itself does not free ctx -- the use-after-free arises only
when the fd is later closed.
This bug was found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/truncate: look up the end-edge straddler by index
In truncate_inode_partial_folio(), after the first split at the start
edge, folio_split() unlocks and drops the refcount of the after-split
sub-folios. The sub-folio straddling the end of the truncation range is
therefore unlocked and only transiently ref'd in the page cache while the
code still derives it from a page pointer inside the original folio.
Between the first split finishing and page_folio() resolving split_at2,
that tail page can be reclaimed, freed and reallocated as a new large
folio in the same mapping at a different file offset. folio2 then points
at a folio that does not cover the end boundary, yet folio2->mapping ==
folio->mapping still holds, so the stale pointer passes the mapping check
and folio_split_or_unmap() splits a folio at a wrong position (or, with a
transient refcount, a use-after-free window opens between try_get and the
split). __folio_split()'s own folio != page_folio(split_at) check cannot
catch this either since split_at2 has been reallocated as part of the new
folio, so page_folio(split_at2) resolves back to folio2.
Look the straddler up by its page index instead. __filemap_get_folio()
returns the folio currently covering the boundary, ref'd and locked, with
the mapping validated under the lock, so the split target is always the
real folio at the end edge. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: hold MP_JOIN msk ref when cloning reqsk
TCP request migration clones pending request sockets with
inet_reqsk_clone(). For MPTCP MP_JOIN requests this byte-copies
subflow_req->msk, but the clone does not own a reference.
The original and cloned requests can consequently drop the same msk
reference, leaving one request with a dangling pointer. This manifests as
a KASAN slab-use-after-free in subflow_req_destructor():
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in subflow_req_destructor (net/mptcp/subflow.c:45)
Write of size 4 at addr ff1100010e008d40 by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-00353-gc27e36054537 #10 PREEMPT(full)
Call Trace:
subflow_req_destructor (net/mptcp/subflow.c:45)
subflow_v4_req_destructor (net/mptcp/subflow.c:694)
__reqsk_free (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:906)
reqsk_timer_handler (include/net/request_sock.h:137 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1147)
Allocated by task 10014:
sk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2246)
sk_clone (net/core/sock.c:2488)
mptcp_sk_clone_init (include/net/sock.h:1848 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3564)
subflow_syn_recv_sock (net/mptcp/subflow.c:883)
tcp_check_req (net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:934)
Freed by task 0:
slab_free_after_rcu_debug (include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2677 mm/slub.c:6439)
rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897)
Last potentially related work creation:
kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:2638 mm/slub.c:6377 mm/slub.c:6504)
__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2289 net/core/sock.c:2391)
sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2419)
__sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2430)
sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2441)
mptcp_close (include/net/sock.h:2020 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3399)
inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:442)
The buggy address belongs to the cache MPTCP of size 2968
The buggy address is 128 bytes inside a freed 2968-byte region
A non-NULL subflow_req->msk means that the request owns one reference. The
third ACK can concurrently transfer the original request reference to the
child and release it, so taking an unconditional hold on the copied pointer
is unsafe.
MPTCP sockets use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and all current inet_reqsk_clone()
callers run in an RCU read-side critical section. Document and
lockdep-check that calling-context requirement. Read the pointer from the
original request and acquire a reference only if it is still live. Use
refcount_inc_not_zero_acquire() so the subsequent ownership validation
cannot be reordered before the try-get, then re-read the original request
to verify that it still owns the same msk. If either check fails, clear the
clone pointer; otherwise its normal destructor balances the new reference.
Mark the ownership-transfer store with WRITE_ONCE() to match the lockless
reads.
The following patch completes the clone fixup for MP_CAPABLE token
ownership. Both patches carry the same Fixes tag and are required for
stable backports. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: prevent scheduling deactivated qdiscs
TAPRIO can schedule a deactivated qdisc after some_qdisc_is_busy() has
reported it idle.
Commit 47e8dbb6e763 ("net/sched: do not reset queues in graft operations")
made graft deactivation skip queue reset, leaving TAPRIO's timer armed.
A late callback schedules NET_TX softirq work, whose dequeue path can
race the unlocked child-queue reset in taprio_reset(). The same skb can
be queued for deferred freeing by RTNL and dequeued for transmission.
In the reproducer, the TAP reader frees it before __rtnl_unlock() reads
its next pointer. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in
__rtnl_unlock+0xa3/0xd0, with a read of size 8 from the freed skb.
Reject deactivated qdiscs in __netif_schedule(). Callers' RCU protection
lets the existing grace period join earlier scheduling calls before the
busy check. Restart nonempty transmit queues on reactivation so suppressed
scheduling does not strand packets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: unlink TWT flow if the MCU rejects the agreement
mt7996_mac_add_twt_setup() links a new flow into dev->twt_list before
asking the MCU to add the agreement, but exits without unlinking the flow
if the request fails. The flow-ID and table masks are only committed
after MCU success, so the still-linked flow is invisible to the
mask-gated teardown paths.
If the station retries the setup, the same slot is cleared and its
embedded list node reinitialized while it is still linked, corrupting
dev->twt_list. If the station disassociates instead, teardown skips the
flow and station storage can be freed while the node remains linked. A
later scheduling or debugfs twt_stats walk can then dereference the
freed flow, resulting in a use-after-free.
Unlink the flow when the MCU rejects the agreement. This restores the
list to its pre-request state while leaving the unchanged mask and
agreement accounting untouched. |