| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Dpanel is a Docker visualization panel system which provides complete Docker management functions. The Dpanel service contains a hardcoded JWT secret in its default configuration, allowing attackers to generate valid JWT tokens and compromise the host machine. This security flaw allows attackers to analyze the source code, discover the embedded secret, and craft legitimate JWT tokens. By forging these tokens, an attacker can successfully bypass authentication mechanisms, impersonate privileged users, and gain unauthorized administrative access. Consequently, this enables full control over the host machine, potentially leading to severe consequences such as sensitive data exposure, unauthorized command execution, privilege escalation, or further lateral movement within the network environment. This issue is patched in version 1.6.1. A workaround for this vulnerability involves replacing the hardcoded secret with a securely generated value and load it from secure configuration storage. |
| The device uses a weak hashing alghorithm to create the password hash. Hence, a matching password can be easily calculated by an attacker. This impacts the security and the integrity of the device. |
| CyberGhostVPNSetup.exe (Windows installer) is signed using the weak cryptographic hash algorithm SHA-1, which is vulnerable to collision attacks. This allows a malicious actor to craft a fake installer with a forged SHA-1 certificate that may still be accepted by Windows signature verification mechanisms, particularly on systems without strict SmartScreen or trust policy enforcement. Additionally, the installer lacks High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), as confirmed by BinSkim (BA2015 rule) and repeated WinDbg analysis. The binary consistently loads into predictable memory ranges, increasing the success rate of memory corruption exploits. These two misconfigurations, when combined, significantly lower the bar for successful supply-chain style attacks or privilege escalation through fake installers. |
| A private key disclosure vulnerability exists in ZTE's ZXMP M721 product. A low-privileged user can bypass authorization checks to view the device's communication private key, resulting in key exposure and impacting communication security. |
| Inadequate encryption strength issue exists in SS1 Ver.16.0.0.10 and earlier (Media version:16.0.0a and earlier). If this vulnerability is exploited, a function that requires authentication may be accessed by a remote unauthenticated attacker. |
| Vulnerability in Best Practical Solutions, LLC's Request Tracker prior to v5.0.8, where the Triple DES (3DES) cryptographic algorithm is used to protect emails sent with S/MIME encryption. Triple DES is considered obsolete and insecure due to its susceptibility to birthday attacks, which could compromise the confidentiality of encrypted messages. |
| desknet's NEO V4.0R1.0 to V9.0R2.0 contains a hard-coded cryptographic key, which allows an attacker to create malicious AppSuite applications. |
| An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit the used, insecure TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 protocols to intercept and manipulate encrypted communications between the Com-Server and connected systems. |
| Versions of the package cocoon before 0.4.0 are vulnerable to Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption when the encrypt, wrap, and dump functions are sequentially called. An attacker can generate the same ciphertext by creating a new encrypted message with the same cocoon object.
**Note:**
The issue does NOT affect objects created with Cocoon::new which utilizes ThreadRng. |
| The Fedora Secure Boot CA certificate shipped with shim in Fedora was expired which could lead to old or invalid signed boot components being loaded. |
| The Use of a Hard-coded Cryptographic Key vulnerability in Juniper Networks Juniper Cloud Native Router (JCNR) and containerized routing Protocol Deamon (cRPD) products allows an attacker to perform Person-in-the-Middle (PitM) attacks which results in complete compromise of the container.
Due to hardcoded SSH host keys being present on the container, a PitM attacker can intercept SSH traffic without being detected.
This issue affects Juniper Networks JCNR:
* All versions before 23.4.
This issue affects Juniper Networks cRPD:
* All versions before 23.4R1. |
| openwrt/asu is an image on demand server for OpenWrt based distributions. The request hashing mechanism truncates SHA-256 hashes to only 12 characters. This significantly reduces entropy, making it feasible for an attacker to generate collisions. By exploiting this, a previously built malicious image can be served in place of a legitimate one, allowing the attacker to "poison" the artifact cache and deliver compromised images to unsuspecting users. This can be combined with other attacks, such as a command injection in Imagebuilder that allows malicious users to inject arbitrary commands into the build process, resulting in the production of malicious firmware images signed with the legitimate build key. This has been patched with 920c8a1. |
| Agentflow developed by Flowring has an Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to exploit the fixed key to generate verification information, thereby logging into the system as any user. Attacker must first obtain an user ID in order to exploit this vulnerability. |
| The use of a hard-coded cryptographic key was discovered in firmware version 3.60 of the Click Plus PLC. The vulnerability relies on the fact that the software contains a hard-coded AES key used to protect the initial messages of a new KOPS session. |
| VyOS 1.3 through 1.5 (fixed in 1.4.2) or any Debian-based system using dropbear in combination with live-build has the same Dropbear private host keys across different installations. Thus, an attacker can conduct active man-in-the-middle attacks against SSH connections if Dropbear is enabled as the SSH daemon. I n VyOS, this is not the default configuration for the system SSH daemon, but is for the console service. To mitigate this, one can run "rm -f /etc/dropbear/*key*" and/or "rm -f /etc/dropbear-initramfs/*key*" and then dropbearkey -t rsa -s 4096 -f /etc/dropbear_rsa_host_key and reload the service or reboot the system before using Dropbear as the SSH daemon (this clears out all keys mistakenly built into the release image) or update to the latest version of VyOS 1.4 or 1.5. Note that this vulnerability is not unique to VyOS and may appear in any Debian-based Linux distribution that uses Dropbear in combination with live-build, which has a safeguard against this behavior in OpenSSH but no equivalent one for Dropbear. |
| A vulnerability has been found in running-elephant Datart up to 1.0.0-rc3. Affected by this issue is the function getTokensecret of the file datart/security/src/main/java/datart/security/util/AESUtil.java of the component API. The manipulation leads to use of hard-coded cryptographic key
. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. |
| The JWT secret key is embedded in the egOS WebGUI backend and is readable to the default user. An unauthenticated remote attacker can generate valid HS256 tokens and bypass authentication/authorization due to the use of hard-coded cryptographic key. |
| HCL DRYiCE Optibot Reset Station is impacted by insecure encryption of security questions. This could allow an attacker with access to the database to recover some or all encrypted values. |
| A cryptanalytic break in Altcha Proof-of-Work obfuscation mode version 0.8.0 and later allows for remote visitors to recover the Proof-of-Work nonce in constant time via mathematical deduction. NOTE: this is disputed by the Supplier because the product's objective is "to discourage automated scraping / bots, not guarantee resistance to determined attackers." The documentation states “the goal is not to provide a secure cryptographic algorithm but to use a proof-of-work mechanism that allows any capable device to decrypt the hidden data.” |
| ### Impact
When this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by an attacker that sends data contrived to produce hash collisions, leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized.
This is similar to [a prior advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf), which provided an inadequate fix for the hash collision part of the vulnerability.
### Patches
The following steps are required to mitigate this risk.
1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available.
1. Review the steps in [this previous advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf) to ensure you have your application configured for untrusted data.
### Workarounds
If upgrading MessagePack to a patched version is not an option for you, you may apply a manual workaround as follows:
1. Declare a class that derives from `MessagePackSecurity`.
2. Override the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>` method to provide a collision-resistant hash function of your own and avoid calling `base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()`.
3. Configure a `MessagePackSerializerOptions` with an instance of your derived type by calling `WithSecurity` on an existing options object.
4. Use your custom options object for all deserialization operations. This may be by setting the `MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions` static property, if you call methods that rely on this default property, and/or by passing in the options object explicitly to any `Deserialize` method.
### References
- Learn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp#security).
- The .NET team's [discussion on hash collision vulnerabilities of their `HashCode` struct](https://github.com/GrabYourPitchforks/runtime/blob/threat_models/docs/design/security/System.HashCode.md).
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* [Start a public discussion](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/discussions)
* [Email us privately](mailto:andrewarnott@live.com) |
